Quality improvement priorities for safer out-of-hours palliative care: Lessons from a mixed-methods analysis of a national incident-reporting database by Williams, Huw et al.
LSHTM Research Online
Williams, Huw; Donaldson, Sir Liam; Noble, Simon; Hibbert, Peter; Watson, Rhiannon;
Kenkre, Joyce; Edwards, Adrian; Carson-Stevens, Andrew; (2019) Quality improvement priori-
ties for safer out-of-hours palliative care: Lessons from a mixed-methods analysis of a national
incident-reporting database. Palliative Medicine, 33 (3). pp. 346-356. ISSN 0269-2163 DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0269216318817692
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4653160/
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0269216318817692
Usage Guidlines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk
https://doi.org/10.1177/0269216318817692
Palliative Medicine
2019, Vol. 33(3) 346 –356
© The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines: 
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0269216318817692
journals.sagepub.com/home/pmj
What is already known about the topic?
•• Around 2%–3 % of consultations in primary care are prone to patient safety incidents.
•• Patients receiving palliative care are not immune to patient safety concerns.
•• ‘Out-of-hours’ services are responsible for providing care for two-thirds of the working week (18:30 to 08:00 on week-
days, and all hours at weekends in the United Kingdom).
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Abstract
Background: Patients receiving palliative care are often at increased risk of unsafe care with the out-of-hours setting presenting 
particular challenges. The identification of improved ways of delivering palliative care outside working hours is a priority area for 
policymakers.
Aim: To explore the nature and causes of unsafe care delivered to patients receiving palliative care from primary-care services outside 
normal working hours.
Design: A mixed-methods cross-sectional analysis of patient safety incident reports from the National Reporting and Learning System. 
We characterised reports, identified by keyword searches, using codes to describe what happened, underlying causes, harm outcome, 
and severity. Exploratory descriptive and thematic analyses identified factors underpinning unsafe care.
Setting/participants: A total of 1072 patient safety incident reports involving patients receiving sub-optimal palliative care via the 
out-of-hours primary-care services.
Results: Incidents included issues with: medications (n = 613); access to timely care (n = 123); information transfer (n = 102), and/
or non-medication-related treatment such as pressure ulcer relief or catheter care (n = 102). Almost two-thirds of reports (n = 695) 
described harm with outcomes such as increased pain, emotional, and psychological distress featuring highly. Commonly identified 
contributory factors to these incidents were a failure to follow protocol (n = 282), lack of skills/confidence of staff (n = 156), and 
patients requiring medication delivered via a syringe driver (n = 80).
Conclusion: Healthcare systems with primary-care-led models of delivery must examine their practices to determine the prevalence 
of such safety issues (communication between providers; knowledge of commonly used, and access to, medications and equipment) 
and utilise improvement methods to achieve improvements in care.
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Introduction
Since the publication of the Institute of Medicine’s report 
‘To Err is Human’ in 1999, healthcare services worldwide 
have endeavoured to reduce the burden of unsafe health-
care.1 In 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO)2 
launched the World Alliance for Patient Safety to advance 
the patient safety agenda with the goal of reducing the 
adverse effects of unsafe healthcare. Palliative care is not 
exempt from these risks. More recently, the Universal 
Health Coverage draws attention to how all people and 
communities should have access to high-quality, safe pal-
liative care.3
Palliative care, increasingly delivered in community 
settings, poses unique patient safety challenges.4,5 In 
many countries, despite out-of-hours (OOH) services pro-
viding care for almost two-thirds of the week (18:30 to 
08:00 on weekdays, and all hours at weekends in the 
United Kingdom), most resources go to in-hours services. 
As many as 30% of patients have contact with the OOH 
service in the last days of life.6 In the United Kingdom, a 
range of healthcare professionals, with variable training in 
end-of-life care practices, are required to meet a patient’s 
changing needs around the clock. They often lack consist-
ent access to clinical information.
An estimated 2–3 of every 100 consultations in pri-
mary care result in a patient safety incident, 4% involving 
serious harm.7 Past studies of palliative-care safety have 
focussed almost entirely on hospice- or hospital-based 
care. These have identified concerns about the manage-
ment of pressure ulcers and the safe use of syringe 
drivers.8–11 Despite patients’ known preferences to receive 
end-of-life care in their own homes, this is often not 
achieved.12,13 Addressing this challenge will mean 
primary-care services take a leading role and likely through 
OOH services.
Investigation of high-profile deaths in the health care 
system of the United Kingdom have highlighted the com-
plexity associated with providing palliative care in the 
OOH context.14 Care is delivered by many different provid-
ers, unfamiliar with a patient’s medical history or current 
needs and wishes, with many consultations occurring 
over the telephone, often without face-to-face contact.15 
A clear understanding of the sources of unsafe care has 
emerged as a top research priority for patient groups and 
policymakers.16
The analysis of patient safety incident reports can pro-
vide valuable insights into healthcare-associated harm.17 
Such analysis has advanced research into the scope for 
safer primary care18,19 as well as in identifying systemic 
causes of harms in hospital settings.20 With primary-care 
safety emerging as a global priority for policymakers and 
increasing focus on delivering palliative care in patients’ 
homes,21–23 a better understanding of risks and causes of 
harm in this complex area is badly needed.
To provide a foundation for healthcare systems and 
organisations to prioritise their improvement, we ana-
lysed palliative care–related patient safety incidents, 
reported to a national database, to derive insights into the 
nature and causes of unintended harm.
Methods
We carried out a cross-sectional, mixed-methods study of a 
patient safety incident database. This combined a detailed 
data coding process and iterative generation of data sum-
maries using exploratory descriptive (quantitative) analysis 
and thematic (qualitative) analysis methods.19
Data source
Data were extracted from the National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS).24 This is a database of over 15 mil-
lion patient safety incident reports from healthcare organ-
isations in England and Wales. A patient safety incident is 
defined as, ‘any unintended or unexpected incident that 
could have harmed or did harm a patient during health 
care delivery’.25 Reporting began voluntarily in 2003, but 
since 2010, it has been mandatory to report any incident 
that resulted in severe patient harm or death. Healthcare 
professionals submit reports to their local healthcare 
organisations, where the reports are first analysed and 
anonymised and then submitted in batches to the NRLS. 
Reports contain structured information about location, 
What this paper adds?
•• Target patient safety issues for improving palliative care in the out-of-hours setting include medication provision, timely 
access to care and non-medication treatments such as catheter care and information transfer between providers.
•• Harm outcomes commonly include pain, emotional distress, unnecessary hospital admission, and hastened death.
Implications for practice, theory, or policy
•• Interventions to address frequently identified sources of harm are presented and should be evaluated robustly in future 
implementation studies.
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Figure 1. Flowchart of sample identification.
patient demographics, and the reporter’s perception of 
harm severity, augmented by unstructured free-text 
descriptions of the incident, offering granular detail about 
potential contributory factors and planned actions to pre-
vent reoccurrence. The database was described in more 
detail in a study of patient safety–related hospital deaths 
in England.20
Study population
The study period was between 1 January 2009 and 30 
September 2013. We searched the free-text fields of 
patient safety incident reports submitted from primary-
care services (n = 240,000) using keywords to identify 
records related to palliative care (n = 7413; Appendix 1). 
The search was then refined to extract those relating to 
OOH care (n = 2502; Appendix 2).
Reports found not to be describing patient safety inci-
dents, incidents not involving palliative care, or not occur-
ring in OOH settings (n = 1,430) were excluded following 
manual review by two clinical researchers (H.W. and R.W.). 
The resulting study population comprised 1072 patient 
safety incident reports (Figure 1).
Data familiarisation and coding
A classification system, aligned with the WHO 
International Classification for Patient Safety,25 was 
developed using an inductive grounded approach,26 
incorporating multiple coding frameworks. These frame-
works were empirically developed in-house using an 
inductive grounded approach, over a period of several 
months. A primary-care-specific classification system was 
developed in order to reflect the unique challenges of 
patient safety in this setting. Codes were developed 
based on the types of incidents identified in the reports, 
following discussion within the coding team, which com-
prised physicians and patient safety experts.27 H.W. and 
R.W. were trained in root cause analysis and human fac-
tors in healthcare and reviewed the free-text component 
of each incident report. They coded the information in 
relation to the following: the primary patient safety inci-
dent type that was reported to have directly affected 
patient care (e.g. wrong dose of diamorphine adminis-
tered), the chain of incidents leading up to the incident 
(e.g. error in setting up rate of syringe driver delivery); 
the contributory factors (e.g. staff knowledge); and 
reported patient harm outcomes. A random sample of 
20% of reports were double-coded to ensure consistent 
interpretation of codes and definitions. Difficult cases 
were discussed at regular team meetings and a third sen-
ior investigator (A.C-S.) arbitrated.
Generation of data summaries and 
identification of themes
We undertook an exploratory descriptive analysis to 
assess the most frequent and harmful incident types, 
the associated chain of incidents, and contributory fac-
tors. We used thematic analysis to identify and describe 
recurring themes that could be targeted to mitigate 
future similar incidents. The most commonly identified 
causes were identified as priority areas for improve-
ment and potential interventions, suggested by the 
reporter, identified by literature searches or the experi-
ence of the team, were summarised in a driver dia-
gram. This is a quality improvement tool to highlight 
priority areas for change, by mapping the relationships 
between a project aim and key areas in a system for 
intervention.28,29 We conducted focussed literature 
searches to identify existing initiatives for promoting 
patient safety in each priority area. Where available, 
the strength of each intervention was graded using the 
US Department of Veterans Affairs classification, where 
the strongest designs are permanent and physical (e.g. 
forcing functions around medication prescribing) rather 
than temporary and procedural (e.g. awareness raising 
communications around prescribing safety).30
Results
Almost two-thirds (n = 695, 64.8%) of the patient safety 
incidents that comprised the study population of 1072 
reports described actual harm to patients and the remain-
ing reports described potentially harmful events (Table 1). 
Serious harm (moderate harm or worse) occurred in 129 
(12%), resulting in hospital admission, permanent injury or 
death. There were four main categories of harmful inci-
dents: medication-related issues such as errors in prescrib-
ing, dispensing, or administering of medications (n = 618, 
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66% harmful); delays in access to timely care or advice 
(n = 123, 65% harmful); shortfalls in the safety of non-med-
ication-based treatment such as catheters and nasogastric 
tubes (n = 102, 69% harmful); and deficient information 
transfer across the healthcare boundaries (n = 102, 64% 
harmful). Cohen’s kappa statistic of inter-coder reliability 
for primary incident type was high (k = 0.7).
Medication-related incidents
More than half of the reports described incidents related 
to medication (n = 618, 58% of all reports). One-third 
(n = 199) described problems with timely access to medi-
cation. Problems with the task of giving the medicine to a 
patient was mentioned in one-fifth of reports (Example 1, 
Table 2; n = 124) with nearly one-quarter (n = 28) of these 
describing failure to administer essential medication 
resulting in patient distress or pain. A total of 93 reports 
described prescribing, and a further 70 described dispens-
ing errors, with the wrong drug or wrong strength of drug 
being prescribed or dispensed. About 75 reports described 
the use of, or provision of, a syringe driver device as being 
pivotal to the incident.
The chain of events leading to medication incidents 
often included difficulties accessing timely advice/assess-
ments, problems locating supplies of medications 
(Example 2, Table 2), a faulty syringe driver or inefficient 
communication processes.
Staff level contributory factors were common and 
included failure to follow agreed protocols, mistakes due 
to inattention or a lack of sufficient knowledge or skills. In 
25 reports, insufficient staff capacity was highlighted as 
an underlying reason for an incident.
Patient outcomes included pain, emotional distress for 
patients and families, and increased work for members of 
the healthcare team. These incidents led to serious harm 
(moderate, severe harm, or death) in 48 and to death in 5 
cases.
Access to timely care
Almost 12% (n = 123) of reports described situations 
where patients or their relatives struggled to get timely 
access to needed care. An inability to get an appointment 
with a clinician accounted for half of these (n = 61) and a 
quarter (n = 33) involving difficulties securing a home visit 
(Examples 3, 4, and 5; Table 2). Problems accessing tele-
phone advice was a particular barrier (n = 21).
A lack of, or insufficient numbers of staff (n = 24; 
Example 5, Table 2) was a commonly identified contribu-
tory factor. Other staff level contributory factors included 
failures to follow protocols, inadequate skills, and mis-
takes or distraction/inattention. Pain, emotional distress, 
and untimely death were outcomes described.
Information transfer
A further 10% (n = 102) of reports described issues with 
ensuring efficient, accurate transfer of information 
between healthcare teams. This included referrals to 
other teams not being made, going missing, or being sent 
to the wrong place (n = 52; Example 6); misunderstandings 
in verbal communication between teams (n = 27); and 
information about a patient’s condition not being made 
available to other teams (n = 20).
Preceding incidents were described in just over half of 
these reports and mainly involved assessment or triage-
related incidents or additional communication/informa-
tion transfer–related incidents.
Contributory factors included a failure to follow agreed 
protocols and organisational problems such as insufficient 
staffing levels or poorly worded protocols. Again, pain, 
emotional distress, and additional time spent by staff mit-
igating the harms were described as outcomes.
Treatment-related incidents  
(non-medication)
A further 10% (n = 102) of reports described incidents 
involving treatments such as urinary catheters, pressure 
ulcer relief, and nasogastric tubes. Reports described 
insufficient treatment given across the course of a night 
or weekend (n = 36), significant delays in commencing 
treatment (n = 36; Example 7) or some treatments not 
given at all (n = 27).
Preceding incidents identified included information 
transfer problems, an inability to access a clinician, and 
equipment-related incidents.
Table 1. Harm severity n (% of incident type).
Incident type No Harm 
occurred
Low Harm Moderate 
Harm
Severe 
Harm
Death Harm severity 
unclear
Total
Medication related 71 (11%) 355 (57%) 45 (7%) 3 (0.5%) 5 (0.8%) 139 (22%) 618
Access to timely care 5 (4%) 63 (51%) 14 (11%) – 3 (2%) 38 (31%) 123
Information transfer 14 (14%) 53 (52%) 12 (12%) – – 23 (23%) 102
Treatment (non-medication) 10 (10%) 51 (50%) 18 (18%) – 1 (1%) 22 (22%) 102
Other 17 (13%) 44 (35%) 21 (17%) 2 (2%) 5 (4%) 38 (30%) 127
Totals 117 566 110 5 14 260 (24%) 1072
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Table 2. Examples of free-text descriptions and harm severities.
Free-text description Harm severity
Medication related
Example 1. Staff nurse reflected on the incident, and she stated that she administered a dose of hyoscine 
which was prescribed for a syringe driver–1.2 mg–as a stat dose. She realised after giving the injection. 
She contacted out-of-hours GP, but patient’s breathing worsened and she called 999 after giving 
adrenaline. No ‘Do not Resuscitate’ order was found in the patient’s home, and so CPR was performed by 
the ambulance crew. At [time] I contacted A&E and spoke to Sister in Resus. She informed me that the 
patient was critical and called back [30 min later] to state that the patient was ventilated … A + E sister 
informed me that patient was transferred to a ward. Ward sister stated that they were trying to send 
patient home as this was their wish. Telephone call received from Dr [Staff Name] at GP OOHs stating that 
the patient had died.
Death
Example 2. Patient assessed as being in last few hours of life was prescribed morphine sulphate injection. 
Primary-Care Trust has ‘End of Life Care (EOLC) Medication’ scheme in place, whereby pharmacy is 
paid to always keep agreed list of medication in stock. Patient’s relative phoned the pharmacy but was 
told it was not in stock. DN then phoned. He was also told not in stock. Spent several hours trying to 
obtain medication – eventually did so from another pharmacy. Further enquiry on Monday revealed 
that pharmacy in question did have the medication in stock but have internal policy of not dispensing 
controlled drugs at weekend except under the EOLC scheme and did not identify that this is a palliative-
care patient.
Low
Access to timely care
Example 3. Call received by the night service at [time] to visit a palliative patient in pain. The night 
service was unable to respond, as all teams were with a patient. The night team attempted to contact 
the [nursing team] 2 h later in 10 min intervals. They were unable to contact anyone [for three-and-a-half 
hours] when a member of the day team answered the phone and explained the phone had not been 
diverted.
Low
Example 4. The patient was dying at home. Patient had injectable medication in-house for control of 
symptoms. Patient began vomiting at [time]. Patient husband called overnight nursing service [around 1 h 
later] as he had been told they could visit to give injection of anti-emetic. A member of staff told him they 
would seek advice and call back. They informed the patient’s  husband that they were not able to help 
and to call [the GP OOH provider]. Patient’s husband called and explained patient was vomiting coffee 
ground vomit. Was advised to give omeprazole and or Gaviscon. [Name of provider] did not visit. Patient 
continued to vomit overnight. When staff arrived the next morning, the patient had had several large 
[episodes of haematemesis] overnight and melaena. Her husband had not been able to clean this himself.
Moderate
Example 5. Called to see patient who is in pain and under palliative care. Patient in pain and very 
distressed heading towards last days of life. Passed over to unplanned care department at [time]. [3 h 
later] GP still had not visited. Contacted unplanned care at this time and they said they had a busy night 
and that the GP who [had just stated work] would see the patient first.
Moderate
Information transfer
Example 6. Patient’s wife phoned out-of-hours service at [time], and GP decided that a syringe driver 
needed to be put up. OOH failed to contact DN with appropriate information regarding the patient and 
at the right time. Insufficient time span for adequate provision of care with a patient at end stages of life. 
Inappropriate use of DN time.
Unclear
Treatment related
Example 7. I was contacted by the staff nurse on duty from a nursing home stating that a palliative 
patient’s catheter was by-passing yesterday and the staff nurse on duty had removed the catheter and 
not replaced it. The patient had now not passed urine for over 10 h and was in discomfort and pain. I 
asked the staff nurse why the catheter was not reinserted yesterday as this patient was known to have 
[a type of cancer] and suffer with retention – that was why the catheter was in place. The staff nurse on 
duty stated she was unsure why it was not reinserted. I stated that the patient did have all the equipment 
as I had only done a prescription for them the beginning of the week. I advised the staff nurse to reinsert 
the catheter; however, she informed me that she was not trained to do catheters and could not perform 
the procedure. I contacted the DN team covering the nursing home and discussed with the DN in charge, 
and as this patient is a nursing home patient and because of his [type of cancer], they were not happy to 
re-catheterise this gentleman. I therefore had no other alternative but to admit this patient to surgical 
assessment unit at [organisation name] for re-catheterisation. This took me approximately 90 min having 
to liaise with the SHO on call writing a referral letter and organising the ambulance. Meanwhile this 
patient was in pain.
Moderate
 (Continued)
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Identified contributory factors include insufficient staff 
numbers or being overloaded by work, a failure to follow 
protocols, or a lack of knowledge or training (Example 8 
and 9). Outcomes once more included pain, emotional 
distress, and hospital admission.
Driver diagram
We mapped our findings to a driver diagram. This showed 
four main areas of unsafe care, each a primary driver for 
change.29 Focusing on the primary drivers, and drawing 
on the output of the literature search, the team con-
structed secondary drivers or interventions which could 
influence safer care (Figure 2).
Discussion
Main findings
We found that unsafe palliative care occurred in four main 
areas: errors in medication provision; securing access to 
timely care; inefficient information processes; and non-
medication-related treatment provision. Actual harm was 
a feature of almost two-thirds of patient safety incident 
reports with many citing emotional and psychological dis-
tress to patients, families, and carers.
Strengths and limitations
Our study is the largest examination of patient safety inci-
dents involving patients requiring palliative care and the 
first to analyse unsafe care for this group of patients in the 
OOH primary-care setting. We drew on the largest estab-
lished national repository of patient safety incident 
reports in the world to do this.
All incident-reporting systems suffer from under-
reporting, to varying degrees. That is why, we have not 
made inferences about the absolute incidence of different 
types of harm. It is also important not to generalise too 
greatly, though it is fair to say that many of our core find-
ings are consistent with studies of harm in other pallia-
tive-care settings. Analysis of patient safety incidents 
allow insights into what happened and why in a way other 
research methods struggle to do. A focus on the most 
common incident types and underlying contributory fac-
tors, regardless of the level of harm occurring to the 
patient, allows identification of priority areas for improve-
ment. Our structured process makes sense of large vol-
umes of data. The study team only had access to reports 
submitted until late 2013; however, by taking 5 years of 
available data, we have been able to show how an organi-
sation might approach improving palliative care in the 
OOH primary-care setting. We identified current change 
options in our more recent focussed literature reviews 
which complemented our findings, but full systematic 
reviews may have identified more interventions.
What this study adds
We found that medication-related incidents were the 
most commonly reported, in line with other studies of 
patient safety.7,17,18,31,32 The complex dosing regimen and 
Free-text description Harm severity
Example 8. Patient has advanced [neurological disease] and can only communicate using eyes. Feeding 
tube balloon collapsed, so [the patient] couldn’t have any feed or medication. Has Type 1 diabetes and 
had had rapid acting insulin but no feed. Despite myself and the GP calling ahead to the surgical registrar, 
F1 and A&E sister to ensure there would be somebody who could change this tube, the patient went 
into A&E and nobody was able to change it. The A&E doctor taped it up and sent him home. The tube 
could not be used, as it could have been misplaced, and he was at risk of aspiration infection etc. This 
had happened before – exactly the same scenario. After the weekend, we tried to get this changed but 
was told the radiographer was the only person that could change it and he was too busy this week. The 
patient was offered admission for NG tube feeding but declined. The appointment was made for 1 week’s 
time with the radiographer but the tube completely fell out the next day so it would then have had to be 
completely redone not just changed. Since then, the patient has decided to decline all active treatment 
and feeding and has gone into a hospice indefinitely.
Severe
Example 9. Elderly patient … at home was being treated for sub-acute bowel obstruction. Despite 
maximal treatment via syringe driver including octreotide, hyoscine butylbromide, haloperidol, and 
morphine, [the patient] experienced a gradual accumulation of GI fluid every 48 h which resulted in 
severe pain … Palliative-care team advised use of a Ryles tube on free drainage. In evening of [date] after 
visiting, I requested that the DNs insert the tube. After a period of confusion (staff were under impression 
that he had to go to hospital to have a tube inserted) … it became apparent that the nurse on duty did 
not feel they had the competency to insert any form of NG tube … The patient did not get a drainage 
tube at any time that evening, he eventually vomited but remained agitated throughout his last night. 
Why was no nurse with this basic competency on duty? Does the trust have a policy for this basic nursing 
procedure in line with the document appended?
Low
GP: general practitioner; CPR: cardiopulmonary resuscitation; OOH: out of hours; DN: district nurse; GI: gastrointestinal; NG: nasogastric.
Table 2. (Continued)
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routes of delivery involved led to errors, and the con-
trolled nature of common palliative-care medications led 
to delays in accessing drugs. Anticipatory prescribing of 
commonly used drugs, electronic prescribing systems, 
prescription chart templates, improving skills of staff, and 
increased access to specialist advice could contribute to 
reduced delays and safer medication provision (Figure 2).
Improving identification of those requiring anticipatory 
prescribing could mitigate some of the problems identified 
and anticipatory prescribing features in most guidelines 
for end-of-life care.33 However, there is a lack of clear evi-
dence that this approach controls symptoms or avoids 
admission to hospital. Establishing whether it does should 
be a focus of future research. Our finding of lack of knowl-
edge or skills of clinical staff (both medical and nursing) – 
whether it be of the medicines themselves or the delivery 
method – has been demonstrated in other studies.4,34,35 
Inclusion of palliative care in undergraduate and postgrad-
uate curricula would address this deficit, as would tailored 
training packages for OOH clinicians who may not have 
time for extended programmes of study. Over-stretched 
staff should have access to palliative-care specialist advice 
quickly, and mechanisms to achieve this need to de 
designed and evaluated. Pre-populated medicines charts 
are a way of mitigating prescribing errors; dedicated palli-
ative-care pharmacies – stocked with a locally agreed 
range of medicines – accessible 24-h a day could further 
reduce delays in accessing medications.36 Specialist phar-
macists or nurses with prescribing skills could reduce 
delays incurred waiting for a doctor to prescribe medica-
tions. Communication solutions to enable members of a 
primary-care team to collaborate effectively – such as 
encrypted end-to-end messaging systems embedded 
within the clinical record system – could allow develop-
ment of a suitable plan for symptom relief without dupli-
cating visits.
A lack of timely access to care from the most appro-
priate professional led to many delays in care and could 
be mitigated by patients, families, and carers knowing 
how to access OOH palliative-care advice, robust triage 
and prioritisation systems, and electronic messaging sys-
tems between healthcare professionals. Development of 
single point of access for palliative-care patients OOH is 
being trialled in some areas and should be evaluated 
robustly for evidence of improved safety outcomes.37–39 
Triage in OOH services has been highlighted as a cause 
for concern in several previous studies,40,41 particularly 
how the algorithms used need to be responsive to the 
needs of patients at the end of life. Once prioritised, 
OOH services need to ensure a reliable system of com-
munication between the various providers of care and 
ensure timely attendance.
Figure 2. Driver diagram to show potential interventions to improve the safety of out of hours primary care for patients at the end 
of life.
Williams et al. 353
Information transfer or communication problems often 
underpinned incidents and are described in other studies 
of primary-care safety.17 Potential interventions could 
include patient-held unified medical records at the end of 
life, electronic referrals systems, and robust messaging 
systems (Figure 2). A unified record of care for patients 
nearing the end of life, accessible by all those who may 
need it, should be the goal and could be patient held. This 
record should include advance-care decisions and 
patients’ wishes, with record of drug dosages and who to 
contact if things deteriorate.42 These should be electroni-
cally based, accessible by all involved agencies and have 
suitable back up in case of IT-related problems.43 Clear 
protocols of who has responsibility for which aspects of a 
patient’s care journey should be made available to all pro-
viding OOH care.42
Advance care planning for those approaching the end 
of their lives has been promoted as a way of improving 
care, with advocates suggesting this process could lead to 
improved identification of palliative patients in triage sys-
tems, increased anticipatory prescribing, and reducing 
unwanted admissions.44 Several studies have attempted 
to increase the frequency and quality of the advance-care 
planning process, its documentation and communication 
to OOH services.45–47 Successes in this area should be 
shared widely and adapted to local contexts.
Urinary catheters and pressure ulcers have been major 
sources of concern for patients and relatives of those near-
ing the end of life. Staff should have commonly required 
equipment with them, or within easy reach. Training needs 
in each organisation should be assessed and addressed – 
with agreed protocols for certain procedures agreed 
locally. A dedicated OOH palliative-care team would bridge 
the skills and knowledge gaps, but its seamless integration 
with in-hours services is essential. Adding a further team 
to deliver palliative care must not confuse responsibilities 
or create communication difficulties.
As new multidisciplinary care models are established, 
the opportunity to test out such ideas present themselves 
with the imperative that they are evaluated.48
Conclusion
We have highlighted the nature of actual and potential 
harms occurring to patients requiring palliative care in 
OOH settings. Lasting, system-level interventions, particu-
larly those facilitating safe access to medications and 
treatments, more timely care for those at the end of life 
and information transfer across care boundaries should 
be the focus of future improvement initiatives.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with 
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this 
article.
Ethical approval
Aneurin Bevan (Gwent, Wales, UK) University Health Board’s 
Research Risk Review Committee judged the study as using 
anonymised data for service improvement purposes and 
approved it on this basis (ABHB R&D Ref number: SA/410/13).
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support 
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: 
The research was funded by Marie Curie and the Scientific 
Foundation Board of the Royal College of General Practitioners 
(grant no.: MC 2016-06).
ORCID iD
Huw Williams  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2818-7079
References
 1. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM and Donaldson MS. To err is human: 
building a safer health system. Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press, 2000.
 2. World Health Organization. World alliance for patient 
safety, October 2004, http://www.who.int/patientsafety/
worldalliance/en/ (accessed 18 September 2018).
 3. World Health Organization. Universal health coverage, 31 
December 2017, http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-
sheets/detail/universal-health-coverage-(uhc) (accessed 
25 September 2018).
 4. Taubert M and Nelson A. ‘Oh God, not a Palliative’: out-of-
hours general practitioners within the domain of palliative 
care. Palliat Med 2010; 24(5): 501–509.
 5. Groot MM, Vernooij-Dassen MJFJ, Verhagen SCA, et al. 
Obstacles to the delivery of primary palliative care as per-
ceived by GPs. Palliat Med 2007; 21(8): 697–703.
 6. Brettell R, Fisher R, Hunt H, et al. What proportion of 
patients at the end of life contact out-of-hours primary 
care? A data linkage study in Oxfordshire. BMJ Open 2018; 
8: e020244.
 7. Panesar SS, deSilva D, Carson-Stevens A, et al. How safe 
is primary care? A systematic review. BMJ Qual Saf 2016; 
25(7): 544–553.
 8. Mazzocato C and Stiefel F. How safe are opioids in palliative 
care? Support Care Cancer 1997; 5(6): 427.
 9. Smucker DR, Regan S, Elder NC, et al. Patient safety incidents 
in home hospice care: the experiences of hospice interdisci-
plinary team members. J Palliat Med 2014; 17(5): 540–544.
 10. Galvin J. An audit of pressure ulcer incidence in a palliative 
care setting. Int J Palliat Nurs 2002; 8(5): 214–221.
 11. Yardley I, Yardley S, Williams H, et al. Patient safety in pal-
liative care: a mixed-methods study of reports to a national 
database of serious incidents. Palliat Med 2018; 32(8): 
1353–1362.
 12. Gomes B, Calanzani N and Higginson I. https://www.kcl.
ac.uk/nursing/departments/cicelysaunders/attachments/
keyreport-Local-preferences-and-place-of-death-in-
regions-within-England.pdf (accessed 25 September 2018).
 13. Commons Health Committee. End of life care, https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/
cmhealth/805/805.pdf (accessed 25 September 2018).
354 Palliative Medicine 33(3)
 14. Cosford PA and Thomas JM. Safer out of hours primary 
care. BMJ 2010; 340: c3194.
 15. Hildebrandt DE, Westfall JM and Smith PC. After-hours 
telephone triage affects patient safety. J Fam Pract 2003; 
52(3): 222–227.
 16. Best S, Tate T, Noble B, et al. Research priority setting 
in palliative and end of life care: the James Lind Alliance 
approach to consulting patient, carers and clinicians. BMJ 
Support Palliat Care 2015; 5(1): 1021–1102.
 17. Carson-Stevens A, Hibbert P, Williams H, et al. Characterising 
the nature of primary care patient safety incident reports 
in the England and Wales National Reporting and Learning 
System: a mixed-methods agenda-setting study for general 
practice. Southampton: NIHR Journals Library, 2016.
 18. Cooper A, Edwards A, Williams H, et al. Sources of unsafe 
primary care for older adults: a mixed-methods analysis of 
patient safety incident reports. Age Ageing 2017; 46(5): 
833–839.
 19. Omar A, Rees P, Evans HP, et al. Vulnerable children and 
their care quality issues: a descriptive analysis of a national 
database. BMJ Qual Saf 2015; 24(11): 732–733.
 20. Donaldson LJ, Panesar SS and Darzi A. Patient-safety-
related hospital deaths in England: thematic analysis of 
incidents reported to a national database, 2010–2012. 
PLoS Med 2014; 11(6): e1001667.
 21. Welsh Government. End of life care delivery plan, http://
gov.wales/docs/dhss/publications/170327end-of-lifeen.
pdf (accessed 8 June 2018).
 22. World Health Organization. Strengthening of palliative care 
as a component of comprehensive care throughout the life 
course. In: WHA Resolution; Sixty-Seventh World Health 
Assembly, 2014, http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/docu-
ments/s21454en/s21454en.pdf (accessed 8 January 2018).
 23. Putting palliative care on the global health agenda. Lancet 
Oncol 2015; 16(2): 131–133.
 24. National Health Service. National reporting and learning 
system, http://www.nrls.nhs.uk/report-a-patient-safety-
incident/ (accessed 25 September 2018).
 25. World Health Organization. Conceptual framework for the 
international classification for patient safety, http://www.
who.int/patientsafety/taxonomy/icps_full_report.pdf 
(accessed 25 September 2018).
 26. Thomas G and James D. Reinventing grounded theory: 
some questions about theory, ground and discovery. Br 
Educ Res J 2006; 32: 767–795.
 27. Carson-Stevens A, Hibbert P, Avery A, et al. A cross-sec-
tional mixed methods study protocol to generate learning 
from patient safety incidents reported from general prac-
tice. BMJ Open 2015; 5(12): e009079.
 28. Fathima N. A quality improvement tool – driver diagram: a 
model of driver diagram to reduce primary caesarean sec-
tion rates. Int J Res Med Sci 2016; 4(5): 1339–1342.
 29. Institute for Healthcare Improvement. Driver diagram, 
http://www.ihi.org/resources/Pages/Tools/Driver-
Diagram.aspx (accessed 25 September 2018).
 30. US Department of Veterans Affairs. Root cause analysis 
tools, http://www.patientsafety.va.gov/docs/joe/rca_
tools_2_15.pdf (accessed 25 September 2018).
 31. Oliver DP, Demiris G, Wittenberg-Lyles E, et al. Patient 
safety incidents in hospice care: observations from 
interdisciplinary case conferences. J Palliat Med 2013; 
16(12): 1561–1567.
 32. Smucker D and Regan S. Patient safety incidents in home 
hospice care: a qualitative study of interdisciplinary hos-
pice team members (771). J Pain Symptom Manag 2012; 
43(2): 462–463.
 33. Ruegger J, Hodgkinson S, Field-Smith A, et al. Care of adults 
in the last days of life: summary of NICE guidance. BMJ 
2015; 351: h6631.
 34. Rhee JJ-O, Zwar N, Vagholkar S, et al. Attitudes and 
barriers to involvement in palliative care by Australian 
urban general practitioners. J Palliat Med 2008; 11(7): 
980–985.
 35. Magee C and Koffman J. Supporting general practitioners 
to provide out of hours palliative care. BMJ Support Palliat 
Care 2014; 4(1): 107.
 36. Wanklyn S. Improving the quality of care in the last days of 
life: a practical guide to getting the medications right, http://
www.londonscn.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
eol-pharma-quality-072016.pdf (accessed 25 September 
2018).
 37. Thorne V. Our 24-hour palliative care hub offers a single 
point of access. Nurs Stand 2017; 31(33): 22–25.
 38. NHS Hambleton, Richmondshire and Whitby CCG. New 
end of life care service for Hambleton and Richmondshire, 
https://www.hambletonrichmondshireandwhitbyccg.
nhs.uk/news/-/blogs/11569496 (accessed 25 September 
2018).
 39. Marie Curie. Palliative Care Coordination Centre – service 
specification, https://www.mariecurie.org.uk/globalas-
sets/media/documents/commissioning-our-services/
publications/palliative-care-coordination-centrepdf 
(accessed 25 September 2018).
 40. Huibers L, Smits M, Renaud V, et al. Safety of telephone tri-
age in out-of-hours care: a systematic review. Scand J Prim 
Health Care 2011; 29(4): 198–209.
 41. Rees P, Edwards A, Powell C, et al. Patient safety incidents 
involving sick children in primary care in England and 
Wales: a mixed methods analysis. PLoS Med 2017; 14(1): 
e1002217.
 42. Faull C, Windridge K, Ockleford E, et al. Anticipatory pre-
scribing in terminal care at home: what challenges do 
community health professionals encounter? BMJ Support 
Palliat Care 2013; 3(1): 91–97.
 43. Maslove DM, Leiter RE, Griesman J, et al. Electronic 
versus dictated hospital discharge summaries: a rand-
omized controlled trial. J Gen Intern Med 2009; 24(9): 
995–1001.
 44. Dixon J, Matosevic T and Knapp M. The economic evidence 
for advance care planning: systematic review of evidence. 
Palliat Med 2015; 29(10): 869–884.
 45. Baker A, Leak P, Ritchie L, et al. Anticipatory care plan-
ning and integration: a primary care pilot study aimed at 
reducing unplanned hospitalisation. Br J Gen Pract 2012; 
62(595): e113–e120.
 46. De Vleminck A, Houttekier D, Deliens L, et al. Development 
of a complex intervention to support the initiation of 
advance care planning by general practitioners in patients 
at risk of deteriorating or dying: a phase 0–1 study. BMC 
Palliat Care 2016; 15: 17.
Williams et al. 355
 47. Mason B, Buckingham S, Finucane A, et al. Improving pri-
mary palliative care in Scotland: lessons from a mixed 
methods study. BMC Fam Pract 2015; 16: 176.
 48. Carson-Stevens A and Donaldson L. Reporting and learning 
from patient safety incidents in general practice – a practi-
cal guide. London: Royal College of General Practitioners, 
2017, http://www.rcgp.org.uk/-/media/Files/CIRC/Patient-
Safety/Reporting-and-learning-from-patient-safety-
incidents.ashx?la=en (accessed 30 January 2018).
Appendix 1
Palliative care–related terms
Cyclizine
Ondansetron
Metoclopramide
Levomepromazine
Prochlorperazine
Morphine
Oramorph
Diamorphine
Oxycodone
Oxynorm
Oxycontin
Sevredol
Hyoscine
Midazolam
Diazepam
Lorazepam
Syringe driver
Driver
Pump
Breakthrough
Sub-cutaneous
Sub-cut
Marie Curie
Hospice
Macmillan
EOLCP
Palliative/palliate
End-stage/end stage
EOLCP
Liverpool
Care pathway
End of life
Terminal
Inoperable
DNAR/DNR
Resuscitation
Advance directive
Living will
Advance care planning
Appendix 2
Out-of-hours-related terms
Out of hour
On-call
Oncall
On call’
OOH
Duty doctor
Duty dr
Locum
Weekend
Night
Saturday
Sunday
BH
Christmas
Boxing Day
Easter
Holiday
Adastra
Emergency GP
OO hours
Out hours
out - of hours
Out-of-hours
out OH
OofH
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Out-hours
Outofhours
Out-of-
O-O-H%
out of – hours
out of-
out off hours
out-off-hours
Oofhours
O of H
out_of_hour
